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CLIO'S FANCY: DOCUMENTS TO PIQUE THE IDSTORICAL IMAGINATION

Society, Matter, and Human Nature: Robert Gelston Armstrong and Marxist Anthropology
at the University of Chicago, 1950
Robert Gelston Armstrong (1917-87) entered the doctoral program of the University of
Chicago anthropology department in the fall of 1939, and at the same time joined the Communist
Party. After completing his masters thesis on the basis of fieldwork in Oklahoma, he was drafted
into the U.S. Army, in which he served for three years, first as a code clerk in Panama and the
United States, and then in the invasion of Germany during the last months of the war. In the
spring of 1946, he reswned graduate study, but after a year accepted an appointment at Atlanta
University, where he taught during the academic year 1947-48. During the following academic
year he taught at the University of Puerto Rico, where he also did fieldwork in the nearby town of
Caguas as part of Julian Steward's team, although without producing a chapter for The People of
Puerto Rico. Upon his return to Chicago in the fall of 1948, he spent several months writing a
manuscript entitled "Society and Matter," which he regarded as essential methodological and
epistemological preparation for a library dissertation on state formation in Africa.
Wtitten during the early phases of the McCarthy era, "Society and Matter" is remarkable
as an explicit attempt to ground anthropological research in general, and Armstrong's doctoral
dissertation in particular, in a systematically Marxist point of view. It is at the same time
intellectually idiosyncratic, wide-rangingly eclectic, informally conversational, and, in the end,
unfinished, both stylistically and substantively. But regarded as an instance of a very small
category (Marxist anthropological analysis in the United States during the early Cold War
period), it is perhaps of some historical interest, as a stimulus to more historical systematic
consideration of that category.
The first twenty-five pages of "Society and Matter" are a "Prologue,'' in which
Armstrong, reverting to his military experience as a cryptanalyst, shows how the jwnbled of
letters of the first two lines of a coded message intercepted from a "from a well-known
anthropologist" could be translated into English-as an analogical demonstration of the problem
of fmding "patterns" in anthropology. This is followed by a twenty-eight page "Preface" putting
forward the "hypotheses" that that the "universe and everything iin it consists of matter and is one
material system, whose parts are organically interrelated"; that "motion is the manner of existence
of matter"; and that "the basic manner of motion and therefore the basic category of the universe
is contradiction." There are then three substantive chapters: "Direction, Trajectory and Networks
of Trajectories"; "Material Things"; and "Criteria of Organization and Integration" before the
manuscript breaks off at page 107. The table of contents, however, lists also two chapters as
"proposed": one on "Patterns" (including the heading "Culture as a system of patterns
conditioned by the human mind"); another on "Society" (as a "material thing" and a "biological
thing," differing "profoundly :fi:om all the previous levels" and "synthesiz[ing] them all."
The completed portions reflect an unusually wide range of reading: philosophers, ranging
from Heraclitus, Zeno, and Aristotle through Aquinas, Kant, and Hegel, down to Bertrand
Russell, John Dewey, and Sidney Hook; political theorists, including Machiavelli, Gumplowicz,
Oppenheimer, and Maciver; psychologists, including Freud, the gestalt psychologists and a recent
compilation of seven contemporary psychologies; natural scientists from Newton to Einstein to
Norbert Weiner; and of course Marxists, from Marx and Engels through Plekhanov and Lenin to
a recent Soviet Textbook of Marxist Philosophy edited by M. Shirokov-as well a nmnber of
anthropological writers including Redfield, Whorf, and, strikingly, the German ethnologist
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Wilhelm Miihlmann. The style is conversational, with extended quotations from numerous
interlocutors, some of them in Armstrong's own translations from the French, German, Italian
and Rvssian originals. The most important of these was the Scottish polymath Lancelot Law
Whyte, who .had maintained in conversation with Armstrong that "the attempt to characterize a
society as a material thing had been "rendered obsolete by the discovery of the equivalence of
matter and energy" (cf. Whyte 1948:68-69). To the contrary, Annstrong hoped to demonstrate
that "dialectical materialism" was not only a viable but a necessary standpoint for the
understanding of a society. To this end, he inserted into his manuscript, as pages 32a-d, a
supplementary statement on "Human Nature," which he listed in the table of contents as "An
outline discussion of human nature as an analogic scenario of this whole thesis." Since the
inserted material refers to two of the corollaries to Annstrong' s first hypothesis, I have included
these as preface to the text reproduced below:

Corollary (Ib): Quite a number of the observable regularities among biologicaL social
and cultural systems are due to the fact of their common materiality and must be explained in
terms of the nature of the functioning of material systems as such.
Corollary (Ic): The description and explanation of phenomena on the biological,
human-social and cultural levels requires that they be first isolated or distinguished
conceptually from the purely material phenomena with which they are inseparably connected.
To do this we must first identity and subtract by analysis that which is merely material in
these phenomena.
[here, Annstrong noted the insertion of pages 32a, 32b, 32c and 32d, as follows:]
These corollaries were suggested by a consideration of the problem of a holisticaesthetic approach to the problem of human nature and to the study of social forms and to the
study of social forms and types generally. Despite the fmm which this thesis is taking, I
fully agree with Redfield and others that the method of explicit statement of hypothesis and
problem before undertaking an investigation has severe limitations. The emphasis on
hypothesis made a great deal of sense a reaction to the old idea that one should approach field
work without preconceptions of any kind and "allow the facts to speak for themselves." It
was found that investigators as a matter of fact always do have preconceptions, and that it is
much better to get them out in the open by specifying than to allow them to remain as
submerged menaces to navigation. Then too, as Miihlmann says, "the facts speak for
themselves if we know what questions to ask."
Nevertheless, I have never felt and do not feel now that the testing of previously
stated hypotheses is an adequate field or research method. Most of the problems that one can
state in advance of research soon look very nai've as the work proceeds. John Dewey has
argued that a major reason why the frame of reference of scientific research methods cannot
be prescribed in advance by an institution or by any other source is that adjustment of the
frame of reference constitutes at least half of the on-going research problem itself I have
certainly found it so in all my own work. Explicitly stated problems and hypotheses should
never impose limits on observation. They are coiTectly used as heuristic guides and as
warnings of the investigator's biases. We must, for example, never allow any amount of
subtle methodological and theoretical disquisition to argue us out of the obvious fact that
people learn to understand and deal with each other all the time. It may be difficult to
establish a concept of human nature rigorously enough to satisfy all the theorists. But
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millions of people have a concept of it that is adequate for many, many purposes. The
elaboration of an even more satisfactory concept, that will be adequate for some of the new
problems the modem world faces, must take this datum of experience into account. Perhaps the
attraction which dialectical materialism as a body of thought has for me is that it alone
among intellectual disciplines known to me allows one to deal both analytically and synthetically
with the phenomena of nature in general and of society in particular.
I believe, therefore, very firmly in the importance of the "naive," aesthetic eye for wholes
among the phenomena we study. Nevertheless, it seems to me that when we deal in this way with
problems such as the nature of the state or the nature of a human being, we run the danger, as
expressed in Corollary Ib, that many of the more obvious characteristics of our phenomenon are
not distinctive. Corollary Ic is intended as a partial statement of a method for dealing with this
problem.
I submit herewith an outline for the conception and study of human nature that I prepared
while attending Redfield's seminar on human nature. In a sense, this material is a digression; and
much of the terminology will only be explained later on in this thesis. It should serve, however,
to illustrate what I mean by Corollaries Ib and Ic; and it serves analogically as a "scenario" for
this thesis generally: I mean to deal in similar fashion with the problems of kingdoms in Africa.

HUMAN NATURE
I.

What do we mean by understanding the 'nature' of any class of phenomena: oysters,
electromagnetic radiation, sulphur, etc.? My answer: understanding the contradictions
that constitute it.

II.

What assumptions must we make on the basis of which to start our study?
A. A human being is a material object and has in common with other material objects
the qualities of self-motion, motion-in-contradiction, and interpenetrative implication
with the other material phenomena of the universe.

B. A human being is a living, organic object and therefore:
1. is a vortex through which quite a variety of material things must pass (such as
food, ideas, visual impressions, etc.), and through which some things must be
kept from passing;
2. has a communication-and-control system, distinguishable, if not separable, from
the organic whole.
C. A human being (matter plus soma plus psyche) ts a highly-if not perfectly
integrated whole.
1. Therefore, any given part "contains" the other parts and the whole process by
implication. (The specific pattern of form and function of a particular prut gives us
information about the rest of the person).
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2. Therefore, a human being can be studied as other systems are studied: by the
construction of hypotheses to explain--or integrate--observed behavioral data, and
then by searching to see if other new facts cominue to fit the hypotheses.
a. introspection and projection are special cases of this: one observes that
many qualities are in common between one's ow-n behavior and that of other
people. One assumes therefore that many other less obvious 'internal'
processes are likewise in common. One's own introspective activity,
therefore, becomes a source of hypotheses for testing generally. Likewise,
one's first test of a new hypothesis from whatever source is usually an
internal, introspective [one] ("Am I like that?" "Does this fit me?''). People
often defend hypotheses which obviously do not correspond to their own
actual behaviour and attitudes. They can be brought to realize this if too many
sub-conscious emotional blocks not interfere.
ill.

Human nature may be conceived thetically, antithetically, and synthetically.
A. the thetic conception of human nature should begin with the identification of the
characteristics which distinguish man from the rest of the universe of phenomena.

1.

He is a two -legged primate with the unique foot that permits him to march in
step, play football and basketball, dance the classical ballet, high jump, skip
rope, etc.
a.

2.

his erect posture has resulted and is resulting in specific alterations in every
bone in the body, the musculature, functions of the internal organs such as
the diaphragm, etc.

He has a unique hand, archaic in general pattern, exceedingly flexible in its
particular form. The similar hands of the other primates are overspecialized for
arboreal brachiation.
a.

the human hand has immense flexibility for too-using, knot-tying, pianoplaying, etc.

b. it is a sexual instrument of great importance.
3.

He has a unique ability to cry and to laugh and to produce a umque
psychological capacity for identification and projection.

4.

He has a unique pattern of sexual activity, being much less bound to rutting
periods, etc. than other animals. Several positions of intercourse are uniquely
human, including that of full-length face-to-face body contact. (No other animal
can do it anatomically, although the other apes come close).

5.

He has a unique vocal and oral apparatus, which permits speech, song-recitals
and the Navaho Night Chant

6.

He has a unique brain, which permits and creates culture and co-ordinates all the
rest.
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B. The antithetic conception of human nature begins with the study of the societies in
which people (like many other biological organisms) live, as being the most human
part of the enviromnent-the generalized antithesis (see page 82 below). (Societies
as natural phenomena can also be studied on their own level as theses, etc. Here we
are asking a more specific question: What is the reaction of hwnan societies towards
the individuals in them?). I propose the following propositions for testing:
1. The adults who make up the leading parts of society at large fmd infants,
children, and young people sexually attractive, they respond to the by direct
sexual arouse and by visual -aesthetic-emotional identification. They are thereby
willing and able to abide the obstreperous and difficult younger generation long
enough to teach it what it must know. As people mature they exchange sexual
attractiveness for greater mastery of social and cultural techniques.
2. A major category of relationship of the individual to society is by the interplay
and pattern-matching of verbal-mental images in conversation. Humans fmd the
sinuous interplay of these patterns in itself stimulating and satisfying, entirely
apart from the. actual content of what is said. Given the contrast principle
discussed on pages 100-101 below, the more intimate, specific and complex the
fit, the more aesthetically satisfying.
C. Human nature may be conceived of synthetically as an exceedingly complex

integration of the general and the particular-human.

1. As a material thing, the human being must be studied in his essential self-motion.
He cam1ot be reduced conceptually to an assemblage of molecules or to external
social relationships.
a.

The most mechanical of his "physical displacements in space" have a deep
and intimate stamp of the human about them. This is even more true of the
quality ofhis physical interactions with the things in his enviromnent.

2. As an organic vortex, he is once again human in the particulars of his vortex
pattern.
3.

In addition to a material and biological aspect bearing a human stanlp, he has a
very large syndrome of uniquely human processes (see III above), which
however, bear a physical and biological stamp.
a. As human food, health, heredity, habits, ideas, culture and society change,
human nature must also be said to change. Insofar as man effects these changes,
he "makes himself" The more or less conscious way in which he goes about this
is probably the most uniquely human feature of his self-motion.

Lest it be assumed that "Society and Matter" is throughout presented in this propositional mode,
it may help to give a brief excerpt of its more discmsive substance, which draws on a variety of
Armstrong's intellectual and life experiences, including in several instances, his ethnographic
research in Caguas. The most extensive and most interesting of the latter is a passage offered in
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his discussion of Corollary IIIb: '"The characteristic relation of opposites to each other is the dual,
contradictory one of unity and conflict":
I found it
difficult to arrive at a fruitful definition of the socio-cultural
phenomenon called the town of Caguas, Puerto Rico, in an informal study I made in 1948.
One could very easily see the entire town by climbing one of the nearby mountains. It had
very well-marked edges; and I always found the thought rather startling that 25,000 people
lived on or in that postage-stamp (as it looked from a.'ly distance). Its architecture and town
plan was typically Spanish, and there was complete unanimity of informants and
documentary sources that the name of trjs collection of houses and streets abound a plaza
was "Caguas." Yet these facts got one exactly as far towards a definition that would be
usef'.ll for the solution of problems in the social science as would be in the information that a
featherless biped dressed in a uniform is called "soldier." The town is the communications
center for the east-central part of the island. This has been true throughout its history. Today
it is the meeting place of five major highways and a narrow-gauge railway. I found that a
large majority of the inhabitants of Caguas make their living outside of it (a list of all the jobs
being held in the town accounted for only about a third of the working force). Even
businesses whose physical plant was in the tov.'11 had their decisive economic connections
outside: many or most of their customers were outside; the decisive businesses were Eastern
Sugar Associates (owned in Baltimore, Maryland) the branch of the Banco Popular of San
Juan, the Chase National Bank, agencies for Westinghouse, General Electric, Ford, General
Motors, Chrysler, Norge Refrigerator and various insular government offices and institutions.
The mayor was also the agent for General Electric. There was a large group of cane-cutters
who lived in the slums of the tmw and who worked in the fields nearby. There was a
diamond cutting factory which imported its raw materials and exported its product. Thee was
a very large group of persons who lived in the town but commuted to work in the San Juan
area and otl1er areas. So it would seem that the people who made their living mainly in the
town itself were a relatively unimportant group that was mairJy perfonning services for
those whose main connections were outside. And yet Caguas was known all over the island
as a town with strong local feeling and pride. In the 1948 election Caguas was the only town
to produce a notewmthy revolt against the Popular Party, and although the Populares carried
the town by a small margin, ma.'ly many Cagtieftos voted for it \vit.lt a heavy hea.>t and soul.,.
searching.
What then does this socio-cultural phenomenon consist of? From one point of view it is a
nexus or vortex of contradictory or "opposite" relationships each of which is characterized by
the fact that at least one of its terms is in some physical sense located i..'l the town of Caguas.
The streets, houses, etc., are from this point of view little more than a fossil which gives
testimony to the nature of a socio-cultural phenomenon whose weight lies elsewhere. The
town's internal definition might be seen to lie in the fact of the conflict between common
residence and external interest of its citizens. And i..'l point of fact, in this respect Caguas is
not different from any other city, since no city that ever was could possibly survived apart
from the multifarious contacts and relationships with the world outside it which are precisely
its raison d' etre.
Now all this is very well. This conception of a city seems to me fruitful and good in that
it suggests and leads to a host of particular new lines of investigation and gives us a live
framework for ordering the facts which we collect. Nevertheless, I am still far from satisfied
with the concepts of "opposites" and "contradiction" in this situation. In what sense is the
dia.'Uond-cutting factory opposite to its source of supply or to its market? In the last citation
from Shirokov we have a hint in that the phrase "new type of internal conflict" is use rather
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incidentally as a synonym for "new contradiction." Now a business relationship mutually
satisfactory to both parties and lasting for a long period is a conflict in the sense that it is part
of the general struggle of the market, and in the sense that there is a certain jockeying for
position around every transaction. But in another sense it rather hurts to hear relationships
which I have defined as long-term and satisfactmy called "conflicts." I see no reasons,
however, to exempt "conflict," "contradiction," or "opposites" from the general "yes is no
and no is yes" pattern of dialectical definition. Once again we see the Chinese-box character
of reality. The exploration of this problem seems to me important, but so large a job as to lie
beyond the scope of this paper" (Armstrong 1950: 52-54)

There was, in fact, a great deal that to Armstrong seemed important, but remained beyond the
scope of his unfinished manuscript However, while he did refer to it in his doctoral dissertation,
in which the concepts of "contradiction" and "exploitation" played a central role, he never
attempted to complete "Society and Matter,", nor to address some of the unresolved issues (one
might even say "contradictions") contained in it. He later spoke of having taken the time to write
it as a justification of his right, in the face of criticism, to adhere to the doctrine of dialectical
materialism; later on, of having spent "a lot of energy on the application of the theory of
dialectical materialism to anthropology and in the end found I was talking only to myself' (in
Stocking n.d.)
It may be assumed, however, that members of the Chicago faculty were aware of the
project, since the surviving copy is contained in Armstrong's student file. And although the
typescript bears no reader's markings, and is not referred to in his student record, it is clear that
Robert Redfield k..1ew of Armstrong's Marxist interests (although not of his Communist Party
membership), since these were explicitly manifest in the doctoral dissertation that Armstrong
completed in the fall of 1950. Redfield read it "from begimnng to end" and in a general way
approved it, although he was troubled by the idea of "exploitation," not so much because of its
"background in Marxism," but because "the concept is not so clearly defined as it sounds" (in
Stocking n.d.)

Despite that reservation, Redfield continued to think highly of Armstrong, and when
Annstrong was looking for an academic job in the summer of 1953, after returning from two
years of fieldwork among the Idoma of Nigeria, Redfield offered him a temporary position as his
replacement during Redfield's leave of absence in Europe. The fall of 1953, however, was the
apogee ofMcCarthyism in American academic life, and Armstrong's appointment was forestalled
by the intervention ofthe Federal Bureau oflnvestigation several weeks before the opening of the
fall quarter (an episode which, along with Armstrong's subsequent internal academic exile and
later career as expatriate anthropologist in Nigeria, will be treated in detail in Stocking n.d.)

Sources
Armstrong, R.G. 1950. Society and matter. Unpublished manuscript in the R.G. Armstrong ftle,
Box 8 of the Department of Anthropology Records Addenda, (excerpted here with the
kind permission of the Department of Special Collections, Regenstein Library, University
of Chicago).
Shirokov, M., ed. 1937. A textbook in Marxist philosophy, prepared by the Leningrad Institute of
Philosophy under the direction of M. Shirokov. London: V. Gollancz.

9
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RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Alice Conklin (University of Rochester) held a Guggenheim Fellowship during 2000-01
for a study of ethnographic liberalism in France, 1920-1945.
Jonathon Glassman (Northwestern University) held a Guggenheim Fellowship during
2000-01 for a study of racial thought in colonial Zanzibar.
'Rob Hancock (Department of History, University of Victoria; rola@uvic.ca) is
completing a Master's thesis entitled, "The Potential for a Canadian Anthropology: Diamond
Jenness's Arctic Ethnography."
Dustin Wax (New School for Social Research) has begun work on a dissertation
examining the "Fox Project" of Sol Tax in tetms of the institutional and theoretical histmy of
post-WWII anthropology and the relationship between Indians and anthropologists.
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following: "L'Oral et l'ecrit. De Franz Boas a Claude Levi-Strauss," by Jacqueline Duvernay
Bolens (15-30); "Cannibalisme et metaphore de l'humain," by Mondher Kilani (31-55);
"Archivari: Dossier etabli et presente, by Jean Jamin and Franc;oise Zonabend (56-65); "Archiver
la memoire des ethnologues," by Marie-Dominique Mouton (67-72); "De !'exploitation des
archives de terrain: une textualization en chaine," by Jan-Lodeqijk Gootaers (73-80); "Du fichier
ethnographique au fichier informatique. Le fonds Marcel Griaule: le classement des notes de
terrain," by Erik Jolly (81-103); "Ethnographie et photographie: La mission Dakar-Djibouti," by
Anne-Laure Pierre (I 04-13); "Les archives de 1' ethnolgie ont-elles une specifite?: Le case de la
Bibliotheque du Musee de L' Homme," by Catherine Delmas (114-21); "Ethnologie d'un
anthropologue: A propos de la correspondance de Robert Hertz," by Alexander Tristan Riley
(122-34): "Biographie et archives: Un cas de figure: Paul Rivet," by Christine Lauriere (135-41);
"A propos d'un mort qui devint pezzentiello: Notes sur les archives d'Emesto de Martino," by
Clara Gallini (143-52); "Les archives improbables de Paul Sebollot," by Claudie Voisenat (15366); "Vaines archives: A la recherche d'un ecrivain oublie," by Franc;oise Zonabend (167-81);
"Feuilles de route en C6te-d'Ivoire (Octobre 1962)," by Michel Leiris--text edited by Jean-Pierre
Dozon and Jean Jamin (182-96).
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